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END-OF-LIFE CARE:
DOCTORS' COMPLAINTS AND LEGAL RESTRAINTS

ROBERT SCHWARTZ*

INTRODUCTION

In her thoughtful paper, Professor Johnson reviews how governments have
attempted to use law to create a medical culture and patterns of medical
practice that will serve the health of the public.' Professor Johnson describes
just how those efforts have succeeded-and how they have failed-in areas as
diverse as medical liability, informed consent, medical billing practices, the
prescription of narcotic pain medication, and the care of nursing home
2
patients. She suggests that we often use the law to encourage providers (and
especially doctors, who ultimately control all other providers) to do the right
thing, and how doctors frequently respond to these legal incentives with
complaints about how these incentives work in unexpected and perverse ways
that undermine their original goals. 3 Finally, Professor Johnson recommends
that we ought to take those doctors' complaints seriously, even if we are
appropriately skeptical that they are based on a misunderstanding of the law or
self-interest of one form or another, because they can serve as sentinel events
that will lead us to appropriate reconsideration of the underlying legal
mechanisms.4
As Professor Johnson points out, physicians have a uniquely important
perspective that makes their views particularly valuable to policyrnakers, even
if their views are not always neutral or accurate. 5 Doctors are uniquely able to
describe how doctors react to laws that intend to regulate them, even if (maybe
especially if) those doctors' reactions to the law are unpredictable or even
irrational. When physicians, as a body, respond to new law by misreading or
misunderstanding it, the rest of us ought to be sensitive to just why they are
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Weihofen Professor of Law and Professor of Pediatrics, University of New Mexico.

1. Sandra H. Johnson, Regulating Physician Behavior: Taking Doctors' "Bad Law" Claims
Seriously, 53 ST. Louis U. L.J. 973 (2009).
2. Id.

3. Id. at 974-75.
4. Id. at 1031-32.
5. See id. at 976-79.
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acting as they are. We may not ultimately accept the doctors' concerns at face
value-those concerns may be the result of misunderstanding or self interestbut the very fact that doctors react as they do is relevant if we evaluate the law
in terms of the incentives it provides to health care providers. Ultimately, we
may not buy the provider's arguments on what a law means or how it should
be applied, but the medical culture may still be more affected by the
physician's perceptions of a legal requirement than it is by the actual
requirement. The misunderstanding itself may provide us with data that are
fundamental to understanding why the law is not working as the lawmakers
expected it to work and what must be done to change the law to achieve its
original goals.
Health lawyers and policymakers cannot always see the same shadows of
the laws that are visible to health care providers, and sometimes those shadows
have penumbras and emanations 6 that are not visible to those outside of a
narrow medical practice. Sometimes those shadows, whether real or imagined,
cause doctors to act inconsistently with the intent of the law, and inconsistently
with the requirements of good medical practice. Doctors may misread or
misunderstand a law. Still, if the law as misread or misunderstood actually
affects medical practice, we should not be blind to the fact of the
misunderstanding. Listen to doctors' criticism of the law skeptically, Professor
Johnson says, and we will know how to create better, more effective laws to
serve the public's health.7
In fact, Professor Johnson's thesis, which she has demonstrated in a host of
ways, is particularly well-demonstrated in the way the law has developed with
regard to end-of-life care. 8 What doctors perceive to be bad law may give rise
to bad medical practice. This bad practice gives rise to doctors' complaints,
which have given rise to new law designed to correct the perverse incentives in
the earlier law. The legal response, though, has sometimes created incentives
for other forms of bad practice, which then give rise to new complaints, and
then a new generation of legal reform. The new generation of legal reform,
whether "properly" understood or misunderstood, will give rise to yet another
set of doctors' complaints, new law, and yet another generation of imperfect
incentives for those providing end-of-life care. Doctors have not always
properly understood the development of the law in this area, and they have not
always adhered to the new generation of law. Still, their comments and

6. The "penumbras" and "emanations" of the Bill of Rights were famously described by
Justice Douglas in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). Just as there are
uncertainties about the meaning of constitutional law, there are uncertainties around the
interpretation of statutes---especially those drafted to address public policy debates like that
around end-of-life care.
7. Johnson, supra note 1, at 1031-32.
8. See id. at 981-84.
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complaints about existing law have contributed to new and arguably more

effective law.
The move from the recognition of "brain death" 9 to the original living will
and "Right to Die" statutes, to the more sophisticated advance directive
statutes that recognized durable powers of attorney,10 to the Patient Self-

Determination Act;'1 and the development of pain relief statutes, 12 physicianassisted death statutes,' 3 the Uniform Health Care Decisions Act, 14 and the new

California Right-to-Know End-of-Life Options Act of 2008,15 have all been
powered, in great part, by doctors' complaints about incentives created by the
effects of then-current end-of-life law. Doctors have misunderstood much of
this legislation, sometimes willfully, and they have ignored other parts of this
law. Still, the law has created increasingly appropriate incentives by listening

to the complaints of those doctors-even when those complaints are not really
justified.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF END-OF-LIFE CARE

At least from the turn of the twentieth century over a hundred years ago,
American doctors have been enmeshed in a medical culture in which death is

the enemy and the preservation of life, in any form, constitutes a victory over
this enemy.'6 American medicine was committed to using all of the resources
available to save lives. The failure to do so was inconsistent with the

expectations of medicine, and, implicitly, inconsistent with the legal
requirement that governed the practice of medicine. Doctors would be acting
inconsistently with both tort and criminal laws if they allowed patients who
could be saved to die.

9. For a good history of the earliest discussion of "brain death," see Alexander Morgan
Capron & Leon R. Kass, A Statutory Definition of the Standards for Determining Human Death:
An Appraisal and a Proposal, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 87 (1972). See also supra notes 17-20 and
accompanying text.
10. For a brief evaluation of the development of this law, see BARRY FURROW ET AL.,
BIOETHICS: HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS 287-301 (6th ed. 2008).
11. The Patient Self-Determination Act was passed as part of the Omnibus Reconciliation
Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, §§ 4206, 4751, 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-115 to -117, 1388-204 to
-206 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395cc(f), 1396a (2006)) [hereinafter The Patient
Self-Determination Act].
12. See Johnson, supra note 1, at 1015-16 & 1016 n.223.
13. The first such statute to be adopted was the Oregon Death with Dignity Act, OR. REV.
STAT. §§ 127.800-.995 (West 2003 & Supp. 2009).
14. UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT §§ 1-19,9 U.L.A. 83-129 (2005 & Supp. 2008).
15. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 442 (West Supp. 2009).
16. See generally Robert A. Burt, Doctors vs. Lawyers: The Perils of Perfectionism, 53 ST.
LouIs U. L.J. 1177, 1180-82 (2009) (finding that "[flailure," i.e., death, "is a defeated
expectation on both sides" of the physician-patient relationship).
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Against this legal background, medicine developed unprecedented ways to
save lives-although frequently the result was just extending the dying process
of a patient. The development of a new generation of ventilators, new
treatments for victims of bums, newly effective kidney dialysis, and other
medical advances, meant that those who would have died almost immediately
could be saved-either to be returned to full health, kept in near-death limbo,
or something in between. The dramatic improvement of transplant technology
at this same time created an additional reason to keep some patients alive (or at
least aerated) when a generation earlier those same patients would have died
quickly. One result of the availability of life-extending technology and the
ability to transplant organs was the development of the formal recognition of
brain death, first in medical and scientific policy through Harvard's Ad Hoc
Committee on Brain Death, 17 then through individual state legislation,' 8 and
finally through the Uniform Determination of Death Act. 19 The initial
committee convened at Harvard Medical School to address complaints of
doctors over the use of the traditional heart-lung definition of death in an era of
ventilators and transplants. Under the Committee's proposed definition of
brain death at least those who had all of the neurological attributes of death
could be declared dead, despite their continued assisted breathing and
heartbeat.2 °

Medical concern over the essential principle that the first goal of medicine
was to save life manifested itself in other kinds of cases, too. While doctors
agreed that it was appropriate to withhold treatment and let patients die under
some circumstances, they complained that the law made them act otherwise.
In some famous early lawsuits, for example-the Quinlan2 1 case in 1976 and
the Cruzan22 case in 1990-family members, supported by physicians, sought
recognition of the fact that the law did not require treatment under some
defined circumstances. The limited success of those lawsuits fed into doctors'
dissatisfaction with the incentives for end-of-life care created by the law. 23
17. The Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of
Brain Death, A Definition of Irreversible Coma, 205 JAMA 85 (1968) [hereinafter Ad Hoc
Committee] (defining determination of death); see Capron & Kass, supra note 9, at 87-89.
18. See Capron & Kass, supra note 9, at 108-11 (discussing the "Kansas Statute," which

was the first attempt by a state to formally define death).
19. UNIF.DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT §§ 1-3, 12A U.L.A. 777-84 (2008).
20. This issue is not yet fully resolved in the law, of course, in part because of the different
incentives and different interpretations of brain death that statutes provide physicians. See Jason
L. Goldsmith, Wanted! Dead and/or Alive: Choosing Among the Not-So-Uniform Statutory
Definitions of Death, 61 U. MIAMI L. REv. 871, 876 (2007).
21. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).

22. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
23. See, e.g., Dorothy J. McNoble, The Cruzan Decision-A Surgeon's Perspective, 20

MEMPHIS ST. U. L. REV. 569, 569-71 (1990) ("Health care professionals had hoped that the
Cruzan case would establish a constitutional guideline that would respect the personal nature of
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The law of homicide, they argued, created uncertainties for those who took
intentional acts (or withheld such acts) with the knowledge that doing so would
likely result in the death of the patient.24 Depending on the doctor's intent, the
consequent death of a patient could constitute anything from involuntary
homicide to first degree murder-a substantial disincentive when keeping the
patient alive obviated any criminal and most civil risk for the doctor. To avoid
criminal and civil liability, doctors would just keep their patients alive-or so
some said.25
At the same time, doctors complained that they were not providing patients
with adequate pain relief because providing adequate relief could be seen as a
violation of common law liability principles, or even a violation of the criminal
laws against the distribution of narcotics. 26 We would like to live up to our
ethical obligations and recognize that there are values separate from saving
life, the doctors argued, but the incentives of the legal system make it
impossible for us to do that. We would like to practice good medicine, but we
cannot-the devil law makes us do it.
When doctors began to discuss the cases in which it would be appropriate
to allow patients to die (and, maybe, to help them die), the legal policymakers
were there to help support a developing consensus. If the law made it
impossible for doctors to allow patients to die, then the law had the potential to
help those doctors and patients too. State courts, legislatures, and, in some
states, the people through the initiative process, 27 set out to find a way to
correct the problem that had resulted in the doctors' complaints. As Professor
Johnson points out, the law has established four different ways to do this:
.
The first way is through education efforts. 28 Legislatures set out to
educate doctors and families about the practical limitations of
medicine, and the fact that the law did not absolutely prohibit the
removal of all life-sustaining medical treatment. Indeed, in some

these decisions and oust the state altogether from an arena that has traditionally, and
appropriately, been reserved for the patient, the family, and the doctor.").
24. See generally Ann Alpers, Criminal Act or Palliative Care?: Prosecutions Involving the
Care of the Dying, J.L. MED. & ETHicS 308,.310 (noting that doctors may be criminally liable for
"any act that grossly deviates from the standard of care and results in a patient's death" and
providing examples of physicians who in fact have been held criminally liable for professional
behaviors associated with their provision of palliative care); Thaddeus Mason Pope, Medical
Futility Statutes: No Safe Harborto Unilaterally Refuse Life-Sustaining Treatment, 75 TENN. L.
REV. 1, 49-54 (2007) (discussing how physicians who unilaterally terminate life saving medical
treatment can be exposed to civil, criminal, and disciplinary sanctions).
25. See, e.g., McNoble, supra note 23, at 585-86.
26. Sandra H. Johnson, DisciplinaryActions and Pain Relief: Analysis of the Pain Relief
Act, 24 J.L. MED. & ETHIcs 319, 320 (1996).
27. See infra text accompanying note 85.
28. Johnson, supra note 1, at 1009-14.
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states statutes were passed with the primary goal of simply articulating
state policy and thus clearing up any misconception that the statutory
or common law prohibited allowing a patient to die.
The second way is through immunity legislation. 29 To more clearly
respond to the notion that providers could be civilly and criminally
liable for any unsaved patient, various right-to-die statutes were
drafted to include provisions immunizing providers who acted in
accord with the processes recognized in the statute for the removal of
life sustaining treatment.
The benefits of these statutes were
extended to both institutional providers, like hospitals and nursing
homes, and to individuals.
* Third, the law also uses safe harbors. 31 Safe harbors are another form
of immunity, although the term "safe harbor" is more likely to be
found in an administrative code, and the term "immunity" is more
likely to apply in cases with potential exposure to tort liability.
* Fourth, the law attempts to correct the problem through the
elimination of asymmetrical incentives. 32 Using this device, the law
could take two alternative approaches to dealing with the incentives
that encourage doctors to over-treat patients at the end of life. Those
incentives could be withdrawn, or other incentives could be added to
counter them. At first glance the second alternative may not seem
necessary, but the fact that many legal provisions may serve many
different purposes may make it simpler to add a counter-incentive than
to remove the original incentive.
These techniques-especially the last one-have been applied regularly
with regard to end-of-life care. If a doctor argues he cannot discontinue life
sustaining medical treatment when that would otherwise be appropriate
because it might constitute homicide, the law ought to create a new crime or
tort that attaches to those who fail to properly discontinue life sustaining
medical treatment. If legal fear discourages doctors from prescribing adequate
pain relief, the law can create immunity, or a safe harbor, for prescribing in
appropriate cases, and maybe it should recognize serious damages when a
doctor fails to do so. As Professor Johnson points out, if law creates improper
33
incentives, law can create compensatory (and thus proper) incentives, too.
*

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 1014-18.
See discussion infra Part H.D.
Johnson, supra note 1, at 10 18-22.
Id. at 1022-23.
Id. passim.
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II. FINE TUNING THE LAW OF END-OF-LIFE CARE
Since the first discussion of the appropriate role of law in encouraging
good end-of-life care in the middle of last century, the law has reflected
consistent reevaluation of the incentives that govern doctors' behavior. Each
new legal effort is followed by a new combination of helpful and perverse
incentives-some with foreseen results, and some with unforeseen results.
Each new legal effort is also followed by a new round of provider complaints
about the unhappy incentives created by the early round of law. 34 Each time
these new complaints are received, there is yet another iteration of law
designed to maintain the helpful incentives and change those that lead to bad
35
care to improve the legal environment in which end-of-life care is provided.
While each new iteration of law is the result of many inputs, the
complaints of providers about how the law is working generally constitute an
important source of information for policymakers. When lawmakers have
listened carefully (but skeptically) to providers, the next round of legal changes
has been most likely to lead to better end-of-life care. Essentially, the cycle
goes like this: doctors complain that the law makes it difficult for them to
provide end-of-life care; legislative or other legal authorities (like the
judiciary) change the law; doctors apply the new legal policy and then discover
that the new law creates impediments to the highest quality care; the law is
changed again-and after each swing of the legal pendulum, the end-of-life
care is marginally better than it was before, although still imperfect.
A.

First Try: Living Wills and DurablePowers of Attorney

In the mid-1970s the first states reacted to doctors' complaints about the
legal incentives to over-treat those who wished to discontinue treatment. The
resulting living will statutes, passed first in California in 1976 and then in
several other states by 1980, overcame the original problem created by the
perverse legal incentive-to inappropriately treat in some cases-by allowing
patients to declare what forms of treatment they would want later, when they
become incompetent. 36 Providers noticed that the new statutes were not

34. See generally N.R. Kleinfield, Patients Whose Final Wishes Go Unsaid Put Doctors in a
Bind, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2003, at B I (providing anecdotal evidence of doctor complaints about
end-of-life care laws in New York).
35. Cf. J. David Haddox & Gerald M. Aronoff, Commentary, The Potentialfor Unintended
Consequencesfrom Public Policy Shifts in the Treatment of Pain, 26 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 350
(discussing the steps taken to legitimize the prescribing of opioids for chronic pain relief and the
reactions of physicians and public alike to the new public policy).
36. For a consistently reliable description of the development of these statutes, and full
citations of the relevant statutes, see ALAN MEISEL & KATHY L. CERMINARA, THE RIGHT TO DIE:
THE LAW OF END-OF-LIFE DECISIONMAKING § 7.01, at 7-9 & n.12 to 7-11 (3d ed. 2004 & Supp.
2008). For a brief account of this history, see FURROW ET AL., supra note 10, at 294-95.
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adequate to deal with most cases, though, because it was virtually impossible
for patients to predict the circumstances in which they would find themselves,
and thus impossible to order this care far in advance. 37 A living will was
valuable only if patients could predict with certainty what their condition
would be and what treatment they would want.
What could be done about the necessary ambiguity and, thus, limited
utility of living wills? Law to the rescue. In the 1980s, listening to doctors'
complaints about the inability of patients to foresee their diagnoses and
proposed treatments, many states enacted laws that recognized durable powers
of attorney. 38
These documents could encompass decisionmaking in
unforeseen circumstances, because they were based on the patient's
appointment of a decisionmaker, not on the patient's making of a decision. If
patients thought ahead and prepared durable powers to appoint agents to make
decisions for them when they become incompetent to do so, it would allow for
appropriate end-of-life care, even when the appropriate care was no care at
9
all.

3

But the doctors quickly noticed that there were as few patients with
durable powers as there were patients with living wills. The doctors could not
overcome the legal incentive to treat unless the patients and their families took
some kind of action before the emergency arose. What could be done to make
these more effective? If only patients knew of the values of these living wills
and durable powers (which were combined into "advance directives" by the
late 1980s), and if only health care providers would ask for them, proper endof-life care could be provided in accord with the wishes of patients. In a rare
federal intervention in this area, Congress passed the Patient SelfDetermination Act4 ° in 1990. This statute-designed to address the problem
reported by doctors who wanted to provide adequate end-of-life care-required
health care institutions (including managed care organizations) to inquire about
advance directives when admitting patients or conferring membership. 41 It

37. See, e.g., sources cited infra note 43.
38. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 10, at 295-96. See generally MEISEL & CERMINARA,
supra note 36, § 7-13 (providing a comprehensive list of state durable powers of attorney

statutes).
39. The durable power movement was advanced by Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion
in the Cruzan case, in which she pointed out that, "in [her] view," the availability of a process to
appoint a surrogate decisionmaker "may well be constitutionally required to protect the patient's
liberty interest in refusing medical treatment." Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S.

261, 289 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
40. The Patient Self-Determination Act, Pub. L. No. 101-508, §§ 4206, 4751, 104 Stat.
1388, 1388-115 to -117, 1388-204 to -206 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.

§§ 1395cc(f), 1396a(w) (2006)).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(f)(2).
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also required those institutions to provide information about advance
directives, and to follow the state law, whatever it might be.42
B.

Second Try: The Uniform Health-CareDecisionsAct

That was not enough. Doctors continued to complain that few patients had
advance directives, and that there was nothing they could do but provide

legally required but medically inappropriate treatment for those who had not
appointed an agent or declared how they would want to be treated under each

imaginable circumstance. 43 In fact, doctors' complaints about being forced to
provide inappropriate treatment got more intense, and the apparent need for
legal reform to allow and encourage physicians to act properly led to an
attempt to use a new proposed uniform act to tie up all of the loose legal ends
that together still created incentives to provide inappropriate end-of-life care.
The American Bar Association approved the National Conference of
44

Commisioners on Uniform State Law's Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act
(Uniform Act) in 1994; this Uniform Act incorporated all four approaches that
Professor Johnson discusses: education, immunity, the creation of safe harbors,
and the elimination of asymmetrical incentives.45

The Uniform Act's primary purpose is explicitly to overcome the concerns
health care providers expressed with regard to earlier advance directive

statutes. For example, it creates a default decisionmaker in every case by
incorporating a family consent provision that allows those appointed by the
patient, or family members of the patient, or, as a last resort, those who know

the patient's values, to make health care decisions for the patient if no one
higher in the decisionmaking hierarchy is available to do SO. 4 6 In direct
response to doctors' complaints that living wills and durable powers of
attorney did not usually result in actual decisionmakers upon whom providers
could rely without fear of liability (because so few patients had signed these

42. Id. § 1395cc(f)(1)(A).
43. See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-95-135, PATIENT SELFDETERMINATION

ACT: PROVIDERS OFFER INFORMATION

ON ADVANCE DIRECTIVES

BUT

EFFECTIVENESS UNCERTAIN 8-9, 14 (1995) (reporting that "[d]espite improved public awareness
of patient self-determination issues" only about 10% to 25% of the adult population complete
formal advance directives; that in 1993, an HHS-OIG study found that only 18% of hospital
patients had advance directives; and that not only do advance directives lack clarity in the terms
used but also that patients are often "not clear in their own minds what they want" because
"[a]nticipating all the possible facts and variables is a daunting, if not impossible, task"); Pope,
supra note 24, at 50-53, 51 n.284 (discussing legal uncertainty in the medical community
regarding the physician's ability to unilaterally terminate life saving medical treatment which he
or she considers inappropriate).
44. UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT §§ 1-19,9 U.L.A. 83-129 (2005 & Supp. 2008).
45. See id. §§ 7-9, at 117-22; see also supra text accompanying notes 28-32.
46. UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT § 5,9 U.L.A. 111-12.
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documents), this statute created a list of default decisionmakers upon whom
doctors may rely with legal certainty.4 7
In this respect, the Uniform Act adopts an approach that several states had
independently undertaken to address the problem doctors faced when there was
no clearly identifiable health care decisionmaker upon whom they could relythe creation of a statutorily defined default list of decisionmakers, most of
whom are defined by their family relationship to the patient. 48 It also
responded directly to medical concerns by providing that doctors could opt out
of the obligations of the statute under some circumstances if their consciences
required them to do So. 49 While it also recognizes a much more limited
institutional right of conscience, the Act is especially powerful in allowing
doctors to do what they determine to be ethically required. 50 Finally, the
statute accommodates the many providers who were concerned that older
legislation could be construed to require futile treatment. 5' While what
constitutes futile treatment may not be obvious, once it is identified, it is not
52
required by this statute.
As Professor Johnson would have predicted, that statute provided for
education, provider immunity, the creation of safe harbors, and the elimination
of asymmetrical incentives to serve its goals. First, the Uniform Act made
education of a public just becoming aware of advance directives easier by
declaring that no particular form is required, and that any form is likely to be
legally sufficient.5 3 Thus, virtually all of the several kinds of forms available
through health care providers, non-profits, religious organizations, and
advocacy groups are legally acceptable, and different education sourcessometimes hospital ethics committees or advocates for patients with particular
conditions, for example-can all participate in educating the public and
providers as to the requirements of the law. The statutory form also uses the
language of ordinary discourse and ought to be accessible to all; it does not
54
require any legal or medical sophistication to draft an advance directive.
Further, it makes it easier to collect advance directives from members of the
public by requiring no special signature form. There is no requirement of any
witnesses, no notary need be present, and no formal action is required to
validate the directive. 55 The statute also looks to educate providers about
47. Id. § 5(b), at 111.
48. Id.; see MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 36, § 7.04, at 7-51.
49. UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT § 7(e), 9 U.L.A. 118.
50. Id.
51. Id. § 7(f), at 118.
52. Id. § 7(f) cmt., at 119 ("'Medically ineffective health care', as used in this section, means
treatment which would not offer the patient any significant benefit.").
53. Id. § 4, at 99.
54. UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT § 4,9 U.L.A. 99.

55. See id. §§ 2,4 & cmt., at l06.
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individuals' end of life choices; it requires that all advance directivesincluding oral ones acceptable under the statute-be noted in the patient's
record.56
Second, the statute includes both immunity provisions and safe harbors,
although it is not always so easy to distinguish one from the other. Both
doctors and family members who make decisions under the statute are formally
immune from civil and criminal liability as long as they act in good faith,
meeting one of the greatest concerns of doctors. 57 Essentially, the statute
provides that if the Act conflicts with any liability provision elsewhere in the
law, the immunity provision prevails. 58 The law creates safe harbors, too, in
several ways. For example, it tells health care institutions exactly what those
institutions must do in order to assert a conscience exemption.59
Finally, in several ways the statute attempts to overcome the asymmetry of
current incentives that doctors claim encourage them to continue treatment
under all circumstances, even when it is inappropriate. Most significantly,
doctors claim that their fear of civil and criminal liability encourages overtreatment. In reaction to this complaint, the Uniform Act provides a context in
which a provider would be as likely to be liable for over-treatment as undertreatment, and the doctor would be fully protected from liability only if he
could justify the treatment6 choice
as the decision of the patient or the patient's
1
designated decisionmaker.
Furthermore, and perhaps more directly, the Uniform Act attempts to
restore symmetry to the incentives shown to providers by providing for
liquidated damages on behalf of a patient when a provider does not follow the
statute's directives. 62 More significantly, as a practical matter, the statute
provides for the award of attorneys fees for one seeking to enforce the
statute. 63 This creates symmetry in incentives to litigate, and it ought to cause
doctors to avoid continuing treatment just because doing so restricts their risk
of liability. Following the adoption of the act, physicians run a risk of liability

56. Id. § 7(b), at 117.
57. Id. § 9, at 121.
58. Id.
59.

UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT § 7, 9 U.L.A. 118.

60. See id. § 13(d), at 125 ("This [Act] does not authorize or require a health-care provider
or institution to provide health care contrary to generally accepted [and applicable] health-care
standards ....
(first alteration in original)).
61. See id. § 5(j) & cmt., at 112 (permitting a provider to require written authorization from
an individual claiming authority to act as a surrogate for the patient, stating "facts and
circumstances reasonably sufficient to establish the claimed relationship," and which the provider
might subsequently point to in order to establish good faith action for purposes of the statutes
provider immunity).
62. Id. § 10, at 122-23.
63. Id.
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whether treatment is withheld or continued, and they also benefit from
immunity to this increased reservoir of liability when they scrupulously
navigate only within the safe harbors defined in the statute. What is more,
private litigants now have the opportunity to use the law to encourage doctors
to follow its provisions.
C.

Third Try: POLSTs

From the perspective of someone who understands the logic perfectly, but
who does not understand medical culture, the Uniform Act appears like the
patch to fix almost all of the doctors' complaints about the process of end-oflife decisionmaking. Although a wide range of providers were consulted in the
development of that statute, the law has not been nearly as effective as its
drafters had hoped-in large part because it assumed that the medical culture
was more malleable than it has proven to be. The Uniform Act creates a health
care environment where end-of-life decisions are made by patients and
families-where everyone agrees the decisionmaking locus should be-and
not by doctors or health care institutions.
The actual environments where these decisions are usually madeemergency rooms, intensive care units, nursing homes-have been less
amenable to a statutory change that put those outside the hospital staff in
charge. Hospitals are hierarchical institutions that demand immediately
identifiable and reliable decisionmakers who understand their institutions.
Essentially, hospitals (and nursing homes) were not ready to remove
decisionmaking authority from doctors, who ultimately possessed it. When
those hospitable to patient decisionmaking began to understand why the
Uniform Act could not fully succeed in their institutions, they began to look
for a way in which the Uniform Act's principles could be applied so that the
decision would ultimately be in the hands of the doctors themselves. Only
through this application would these decisions actually be given effect in the
institutions.
Doctors' complaints about losing their authority in the end-of-life
decisionmaking process were addressed through the development of the
physician's order regarding end-of-life care, most commonly called the
Physician Orders for Life-Sustaining Treatment 64 (POLST) or, in New York,

64. See Susan E. Hickman et al., Hope for the Future: Achieving the Original Intent of
Advance Directives, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Nov.-Dec. 2005, at S26, S27-S28. For an update
on the adoption of physician's orders with regard to end-of-life care and a complete list of
resources relating to POLSTs, see POLST, Resources, http://www.ohsu.edu/polst/resources/
index.htm (last visited June 4, 2009).
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the Medical Orders for Life Sustaining Treatment (MOLST). 65 Also called
Physician Orders for Scope of Treatment (POST),66 and, most recently, the
Physician's Orders to Permit Natural Dying (PO-PND), 67 these orders address

most of the issues that arise in the context of the advance directive
contemplated by the Uniform Act, but they are ultimately identified as orders
of the doctor, not directives of the patient.68 As a consequence of this change
in form, arguably they are more likely to be carried out, even without the force

of a statute behind them. Furthermore, they clean up the uncertainties that
might arise in the application of the Uniform Act by focusing on one episode
(they are short term documents, but renewable) and dealing with do not
resuscitate orders, medication issues, assisted eating and drinking, and

sometimes other questions. Most physician's orders programs provide that the
forms will be on some specially colored paper (usually bright pink or green) so
they will be easily identifiable in the file-and so they will be formally
recognized documents.
The preparation of such a document requires serious and extensive

consultation between the patient (who also must sign the document in some
versions of this process), the patient's family (who must sign if the patient does
not have capacity to do so), and the physician (who must agree to be available
to confirm all of the signatures). These documents are not designed to replace
the Uniform Act; rather, they are designed to make the decisions made under
the Uniform Act actually effective by translating them from patients' requests

(as they were seen) into doctors' orders (which will actually be followed).
In some states, this has been a legal movement, and the validity of these
physicians' orders is recognized in statute law. 69 In some states the documents

65. See New York Dep't of Health, Medical Orders for Life Sustaining Treatment,
http://www.health.state.ny.us/professionals/patients/patient-rights/molst/
(last visited June 4,
2009).
66. See, e.g., West Virginia Health Care Decisions Act, W. VA. CODE §§ 16-30-3(u), -25
(LexisNexis 2006).
67. See, e.g., Stanley A. Terman, Advance Directive/Physician's Orders to Permit Natural
Dying, http://www.caringadvocates.org/AD-PND.PO-PND.php (last visited June 4, 2009)
(providing information about PO-PNDs and sample PO-PND forms).
68. For a comprehensive discussion of these physician orders programs, including how they
improve issues associated with advance directives as contemplated by the Uniform Act, and the
process typically involved with executing a physician order document, see Hickman et al., supra
note 64.
69. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 4780-4786 (West Supp. 2009) (authorizing POLSTs);
IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 39-4512A to -4512C (2008) (authorizing the use of POSTs); MD. CODE
ANN., HEALTH-GEN. §5-608.1 (LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 2008) (authorizing the use of
"Instructions on Current Life-Sustaining Treatment Options" (previously "Patient's Plan of
Care")); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.17 (LexisNexis 2007) (recognizing MOSTs); W. VA. CODE
§§ 16-30-3(u), -25 (recognizing the use of POSTs); see also Kathy L. Cerminara & Seth M.
Bogin, A PaperAbout a Piece of Paper: Regulatory Action as the Most Effective Way to Promote
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are recognized through hospital policy, or even through custom. 70 In either
case, POLST, or POLST-like documents, demonstrate Professor Johnson's
theme once again: that doctors, at the cutting edge of end-of-life care,
understand, as a practical matter, why current processes are not achieving their
ends. While we should view doctors' complaints skeptically, we are able to
improve the quality of medical care by acknowledging their perspective and
reviewing their recommendations. 7 1 Some advocates of the Uniform Act
viewed doctors' complaints about moving the power of decisionmaking from
doctors to patients as nothing more than the doctors' attempt to maintain power
in an increasingly patient-oriented health care system. Others recognized that
the doctors really did understand what was required to carry out patients'
desires in real world settings.
The doctors were in a unique position to see how the law really worked,
which, of course, was not entirely the way it was designed to work. In some
ways, the advance directive movement had succeeded, but in some ways it
would continue to fail because American health care institutions were not
willing to listen to anyone other than doctors. By listening to those doctors, we
were able to craft a system that gave authority to patients in practice, through
the device of formally returning authority to doctors. Because the physician's
order movement was not one based entirely in law, it did not use the devices
Professor Johnson described-education, immunity, the creation of safe
harbors, and newly symmetrical incentives-as statutory movements had. The
consequence, however, is in fact the same-the creation of a form that will
educate doctors as well as patients, effectively give doctors who follow it
immunity as long as they stay within the safe harbors, and end the asymmetry
of hospital incentives that now require following the last doctor's orders even
if they conflict with the patient's legally expressed wishes.
D. Fourth Try: The Right to Know End-of-Life Options Act

Sometimes doctors can identify legal gaps that adversely affect care, but
the law cannot act to fill those gaps.
The most recent statutory
acknowledgement that our medical culture requires physicians to issue orders
to provide for end-of-life care is found in California's Right to Know End-ofLife Options Act72 (RTKEOLO), which was signed into law in that state at the
very end of 2008. Because it has just become effective, it is difficult to know
just what the consequences of the Act will be-but it was designed to

Use of Physician Ordersfor Life-Sustaining Treatment, 29 J. LEGAL MED. 479, 491-93 (2008)
(discussing and comparing state statues that recognize physician orders).
70. See Cerminara & Bogin, supra note 69, at 486-88 (discussing states' grassroots
implementation of POLST or POLST-like programs).
71. See Johnson, supra note 1, at 1031-32.
72. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 442 (West Supp. 2009).
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overcome problems in the culture of end-of-life care that were recognized by
doctors who regularly engaged in that care. 73 Unfortunately, there was an
insufficient legislative majority in support of any particular resolution of that
problem, and its resolution thus may have to await an appropriate judicial
review.
Ostensibly, the statute simply articulates the obligation of physicians to
inform terminally ill patients about the end-of-life care options that are
available to them when those patients request that information.7 4 We might
assume that this was also implicit in the law of informed consent in California.
Although the RTKEOLO bill was substantially amended in its journey through
the California legislature, the original text was designed to protect medical
practice in just the ways that Professor Johnson suggested such legislation
often works: it explicitly incorporated as appropriate end-of-life options the
very alternatives that had been the subject of legal ambiguity. It was designed
to educate health care providers, patients, and families of those options, and
even in its final diluted form, it implicitly provides legal immunity to those
practitioners who act within the limits-really, the safe harbors-identified in
the statute.
By its terms, the statute requires that providers inform terminally ill
patients about their right to refuse or withdraw life-sustaining treatment, about
hospice care (at home and in a health care setting), about their prognosis with
and without curative treatment, and about the full range of palliative care that
is available. 75 Most doctors-and legislators-agreed on that part of the
solution to the legal gap that health care providers had identified. As originally
drafted, though, the bill would have required physicians to inform patients
about two forms of end-of-life care that some physicians thought were
illegal-"voluntary stopping of eating and drinking" (VSED), which includes
the decision of the patient to refuse nutrition and hydration by mouth and by
medical means, 76 and palliative sedation, which is the "administration of
sedative medication to the point of unconsciousness. ' 77 In addition, before
those sections were completely eliminated from the bill, the bill was amended
to include the description of palliative sedation as an "intervention of last
resort to reduce severe, refractory pain or other distressing clinical

73. See id. § 442 (historical and statutory notes).
74. See § 442.5.
75. Id. § 442.5(a)(1)-(6).
76. Assemb. B. 2747, 2008 Leg., Reg. Sess., Sec. 2, § 442(g) (Cal. 2008) (as amended in
Assembly, May 15, 2008).
77. Id. Sec. 2, § 442(e).
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that "[p]alliative sedation is not intended to cause
symptoms, ' 78 and it noted
79

death or shorten life."

The RTKEOLO legislation grew out of complaints by physicians about (1)
the information that was available to patients making end-of-life decisions, and
(2) in particular, the failure of many patients to be told about VSED and
palliative sedation, options available to those patients. Initially the bill was
opposed by physicians who oppose VSED and palliative sedation, and who
claim to foresee the next iteration of problems that would arise out of the
application of the formal legal approval of these processes. The statute was
successful in addressing one problem recognized by physicians under current
law-the failure of the medical system to educate patients about end of life
options generally. On the other hand, the original draft of the bill, with its
references to VSED and palliative sedation, included the clear message that
both VSED and palliative sedation were permitted, and that patients must be
informed about those options. 81 Because these provisions were removed from
the bill, these alternatives remain in legal limbo in California, and some
physicians may remain reluctant to provide this care which others assume to be
among reasonable and legally permitted medical alternatives.
By defining and limiting the use of VSED and palliative sedation, the
intermediate draft of the bill would have created safe harbors for providers
who acted within those definitions. For example, the statute would have been
explicit in allowing doctors to order palliative sedation only when the purpose
of that treatment is to relieve severe, refractory pain, and to neither cause death
82
nor shorten life (assuming those can be distinguished). Any physician would
have known how to navigate VSED and palliative sedation while staying
within the safe harbor implicitly created by the statute, and thus physicians
would have benefited from de facto immunity by acting within those statutory
limits. Similarly, the original bill would have removed the asymmetrical
incentives that zealous prosecutors can impose on doctors who believe that
their patients may wish to consider VSED or palliative sedation. Physicians no
longer would have been at risk of criminal liability if they recommended or
carried out these options, and that risk, as small as it may be, is probably
sufficient to discourage some doctors from even providing relevant
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See generally Kevin B. O'Reilly, California Law Mandates Discussing End-of-Life
Options, AMER. MED. NEWS, Nov. 10, 2008, http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2008/l 1/10/
prscl ll0.htm (noting physicians' fears that the bill, as originally drafted, would lead to the
legalization of assisted suicide).
81. See Bill Analysis, Assemb. B. 2747, 2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2008) (as amended in
Assembly April 24, 2008), available at http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/07-08/bill/asm/ab_27012750/ab_2747_cfa_20080502_154817asm floor.html.
82. See supra text accompanying notes 78-79.
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information to patients. 83 Unfortunately, as a result of the amendments of the
bill, physicians still face uncertainty over the legal propriety of VSED and
palliative sedation.
With regard to the RTKEOLO Act, providers told the legislature about the
ambiguity they faced under previous law. It simply was not clear whether or
not VSED or palliative sedation were permitted. The law was asked to resolve
this uncertainty. The state legislature recognized the importance of telling
patients of the options available to them at the end of life, and it recognized
that physicians had not been doing so before. It filled in that legal gap. While
the legislature also recognized the problem of the uncertainty surrounding
VSED and palliative sedation and set out to resolve it, the legislature turned
out to be as ambivalent about the solution as providers-and the rest of
society-had been.
E. A Note on Physician-AssistedDeath
While a discussion of physician-assisted death is beyond the scope of this
brief essay, it is worth considering the application of Professor Johnson's
thoughts on doctors' complaints about "bad law" to this area of law. In fact,
there has not been much fine tuning of common law or legislation providing
for physician-assisted death, and doctors-who have been prominent among
those who have supported and opposed physician-assisted death-have not
provided consistent analysis of the few laws that exist. The first statute
formally permitting physician-assisted death, the Oregon Death with Dignity
Act, 84 became effective a decade ago, and it has since been the subject of a
great deal of data collection and analysis. Like the Oregon statute, the newer
Washington statute was approved through the initiative process rather than the

83. The ambiguity faced by physicians in this area is demonstrated by the fact that the
American Medical Women's Association (AMWA) felt obliged to include a statement in its
recent "Statement on Aid in Dying" within which the organization attempted to define the way
out of the quandary:
AMWA also supports the following practices in the care of terminally ill patients and
maintains that these practices are not forms of physician assisted dying.
" The provision of palliative care measures to alleviate pain even if the patient's death is a
possible side effect of the treatment.
" The withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining measures as requested by a patient or
surrogate thereby allowing the patient to die as a direct result of his/her illness.
• Providing only supportive care to patients who voluntarily stop eating and drinking.
American Medical Women's Association, Aid in Dying, http://www.amwa-doc.org/index.cfm?
objectld=242FFEF5-D567-0B25-585DC5662AB71DF9 (last visited July 13, 2009) (footnotes
omitted). Of course, the first bullet point refers to palliative sedation and the last to VSED. If the
status of these forms of treatment were well-established, such a statement would not have been

necessary.
84. Oregon Death with Dignity Act, OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800-897 (West 2003 & Supp.
2009).
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normal legislative process. 85 More recently, a Montana state court has found a
state constitutional right to obtain physician assistance
in death, and that
86
decision is now pending in the Montana Supreme Court.
Because none of the state law in this area developed through the legislative

process, doctors' complaints about this area of law have taken different forms
than the more usual doctors' complaints about law that has bad consequences
on the practice of good medicine. However, we can review doctors' comments
on new and proposed physician-assisted death statutes to glean the insights that
doctors have on how such laws actually affect the practice of medicine. 87 In

fact, physicians' arguments with regard to physician-assisted death, on either
side of the issue, have been directed to what those physicians see as the real

consequences of the existence of laws permitting physicians to assist in the
death of their patients. 88 Doctors are not so likely to believe that there will be
very many cases of physician-assisted death, at least if it is regulated in ways
similar to the way it is regulated in Oregon. On the other hand, many
providers have warned policymakers that the environment in which we
provide-end-of life care will change in radical ways (positively or negatively,
depending on the observer) if there is legal authorization of physician-assisted
death. 89 We may not have to choose between the complaints made by doctors
who support physician-assisted death and those who oppose it; however, as
Professor Johnson instructs us, we should listen carefully to the arguments

raised by each side, and to the complaints about the current and prospective
law that come from each side. Doctors are not as concerned about the actual

85. See Washington Death with Dignity Act, WASH. REV. CODE § 70.245.010-.904 (2008).
86. Baxter v. State, No. ADV-2007-787 (Mont. Dist. Ct, Dec. 5, 2008) (on file with Saint
Louis University Law Journal),appealfiled DA-09-0051 (Mont.) (May 15, 2009).
87. These arguments can be found in a number of different and inconsistent sources. Most
are summarized in MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 36, and some are expanded upon in an
excellent account of what the future of the debate on physician-assisted death holds, MARGARET
PABST BATTIN, ENDING LIFE: ETHICS AND THE WAY WE DIE (2005).
88. See generally Jerald G. Bachman et al., Attitudes of Michigan Physicians and the Public
Towards Legalizing Physician-Assisted Suicide and Voluntary Euthanasia, 334 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 303, 303 (1996) (noting that physicians who support the legalization of physician-assisted
death emphasize "the relief of suffering, individual autonomy, and patient's right to be free from
paternalistic state intrusion," while physicians who oppose legalization argue that doing so would
"represent a profound change in social values, have serious unintended consequences, and that
any gains from accepting the practice are not worth the risks"); BATrIN, supra note 87, at 25
(providing an anecdotal example of a physician who believes that legalizing physician-assisted
death might compromise physician judgment in the "conditions of medical practice in urban
hospitals").
89. See, e.g., BATIN, supra note 87, at 25 (2005) (discussing the concern that physicianassisted death laws would lead to widespread abuse of the practice).
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operation of a physician-assisted death statute
as they are about the real
90
consequences it will have for end-of-life care.

Doctors who support physician-assisted death, for example, do not argue
that the primary benefit of the statute will be the few people who take

advantage of its terms. After all, only a few dozen people take a lethal
prescription written under the Oregon Death with Dignity Act each year,9 1 but
the statute has changed the practice of medicine in other ways, too. Doctors
who support such legislation argue that it will lead physicians to focus more on
end-of-life care and provide better care generally.92 They point out that the

very existence of the legal option of physician-assisted death will assure
terminally ill patients that they are in control, and that they do not need to
choose death now to avoid untreatable pain later.93 In fact, some argue, the

existence of a physician-assisted death option may actually go a long way to
create an environment in which terminally ill patients opt to stay alive longer

90. See Johnson, supra note 1, at 992-1005.
91. OR. PUB. HEALTH Div., DEP'T HUMAN SERV., 2008 SUMMARY OF OREGON'S DEATH
WITH DIGNITY ACT (2009) (reporting that since the Act became effective in 1997, 401 patients
have died using prescriptions written under the terms of the Act; and that in 2008, 54 out of 88
prescriptions for "lethal medications" were used).
92. See, e.g., Timothy E. Quill, Legal Regulation of Physician-Assisted Death-The Latest
Report Cards, 356 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 1911, 1912 (2007) (noting that legalization of physicianassisted death in Oregon resulted in "more open conversation and careful evaluation of end-of-life
options" between both patients and their physicians and patients and their families). See also
OFFICE OF DISEASE PREVENTION & EPIDEMIOLOGY, OR. DEP'T OF HUMAN SERVS., SIXTH
ANNUAL REPORT ON OREGON'S DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT 15-16 (2004), noting that:
The availability of [Physician Assisted Suicide (PAS)] may have led to efforts to
improve end-of-life care through other modalities. While it may be common for patients
with a terminal illness to consider PAS, a request for PAS can be an opportunity for a
medical provider to explore with patients their fears and wishes around end-of-life care,
and to make patients aware of other options. Often once the provider has addressed
patients' concerns, he or she may choose not to pursue PAS. The availability of PAS as
an option in Oregon also may have spurred Oregon doctors to address other end-of life
care options more effectively. In one study Oregon physicians reported that, since the
passage of the Death with Dignity Act in 1994, they had made efforts to improve their
knowledge of the use of pain medications in the terminally ill, to improve their
recognition of psychiatric disorders such as depression, and to refer patients more
frequently to hospice.
93. See, e.g., Timothy E. Quill, The Million Dollar Question, 352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1632,
1632 (2005) (suggesting that simply knowing that they have the ability to end their own life,
allows terminally ill patients to feel less "trapped" and thus "freer to keep going"); see also
PHYSICIAN ASSISTED DYING: THE CASE FOR PALLIATIVE CARE & PATIENT CHOICE (Timothy E.
Quill & Margaraet P. Battin, eds. 2004) [hereinafter PHYSICIAN ASSISTED DYING]; Linda Ganzini
et al., Physicians' Experiences with the Oregon Death with Dignity Act, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED.
557 (2000).
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because they will be in charge of their own medical destiny. 94 Some doctors
tell us that
permitting physician-assisted death may actually decrease its
95
incidence.
Similarly, those doctors who oppose the legalization of physician-assisted
death are not so worried about the actual implementation of those statutes,
because those physicians know that the numbers of covert and arguably illegal
physician-assisted deaths dwarfs the number that will be done, with much
greater oversight, under a statutory scheme. Instead, they oppose physicianassisted death because they believe that it will create an environment in which
those given the choice are denigrated by the very existence of the choice, that
the right to physician-assisted death will become an obligation (for the
disabled, for example), 96 and that it will destroy the doctor-patient relationship
by causing patients to see doctors as agents of death as well as agents of life
and health.97 Physicians understand that the debate over the legal status of
physician-assisted death is not really about those few deaths that will occur
under those statutes, but about the effect of the statutes on other aspects of endof-life decisionmaking. Perhaps we will benefit from their insights and
complaints by evaluating how to institute a physician-assisted death statute that
really does recognize the social value of sometimes devalued people, like the
disabled, that does not denigrate those groups, and will still allow individual
patients to control their own medical destiny, maintain control of their dying
process, and have access to adequate pain relief. Perhaps, in fact, that is what
California's Right to Know End-of-Life Options Act does. 98 Perhaps we have
been educated by listening-skeptically, of course, because doctors are also
acting to protect their own values and resources-to doctors' complaints about
the law and doctors' suggestions about how the law should work.

94. See, e.g., OFFICE OF DISEASE PREVENTION & EPIDEMIOLOGY, OR. DEP'T OF HUMAN
SERVS., EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT ON OREGON'S DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT 15-16 (2006);

Linda Ganzini et al., Oregon Physicians'Attitudes About and Experiences with End-of-Life Care
Since Passageof the Oregon Death with Dignity Act, 285 JAMA 2363 (2001).
95. See, e.g., PHYSICIAN ASSISTED DYING, supra note 93; Cavin P. Leeman, Letter to the
Editor, Physician-AssistedDeath, 347 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 1041, 1041 (2002) (noting that only a
third of patients requesting physician-assisted death actually used it).
96. See, e.g., R.J. George et al., Legalised Euthanasia Will Violate the Rights of Vulnerable
Patients, 331 BRIT. MED. J. 684, 684 (2005) (arguing that legalized physician-assisted death
would not only create a "duty of therapeutic killing" for physicians but it also would "infer a duty
to die" on individuals with disabilities). See generally BATlIN, supra note 87, at 26 (noting the
concern among physicians about the potential for abuse of legal physician-assisted death in
situations dealing with certain "vulnerable groups," including women, people with disabilities,
and the elderly).
97. See generally MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 36, § 12.04(F) (discussing fears that
legalizing physician assisted death would "undermine public trust in medicine's dedication to
preserving the life and health of patients").

98. See discussion supra Part II.D.
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CONCLUSION

The law attempts to create a medical culture that will allow-or even
require-good health care. In creating this law, lawmakers should be sensitive
to suggestions made by those who actually provide the care. Although doctors
and other providers may mistake or misinterpret the law, they understand the
real world consequences of the law in ways that lawyers cannot. The very fact
that a doctor mistakes or misunderstands a law relating to end-of-life care is
highly relevant to those who are charged with figuring out how the law should
be changed. Laws govern through their terms, and also through their shadows.
As Professor Johnson explains, in crafting law to lead to good quality health
care, policymakers should remember that health law is often most effective
when it educates, creates immunities for providers, creates safe harbors, or
eliminates asymmetrical incentives. 99 Doctors are particularly helpful in
guiding lawmakers to an understanding of what kinds of tools will be most
useful under particular circumstances.
From the original living will legislation to the advance directive
movement, to the Uniform Health Care Decisions Act to recent statutes like the
California Right to Know Act, Professor Johnson's thesis is demonstrated
particularly clearly by considering the development of law relating to end-oflife care. It has taken several legal iterations, each improving on the last, to
create the current law of end-of-life care. The improvement in each iteration is
the result of our careful but skeptical attempt to listen to doctors' descriptions
of their experiences with the last round of legal developments.
Lawyers are used to analyzing what laws do, but it is harder for lawyers to
see the shadows those laws cast and to identify the effect of those shadows on
the health of the community. We will be better off if we depend on those who
practice medicine amid those shadows to help us determine why the shadows
are cast as they are, and how we could create ones that provide just the shade
that we want. We should listen to doctors seriously, albeit skeptically, when
we refine the law with regard to end-of-life care.

99. See Johnson, supra note 1.
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